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BOOKS REVIEWED
THE UNITY OF LAW & MORTALITY: A REFUTATION OF LEGAL POSITIVISM. By
M.J. Detmold. London (1984).
M. J. Detmold, a Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Adelaide,
has written a book that is as flawed as it is ambitious, and it is mightily am-
bitious. Its ambitiousness is only dimly revealed by its triumphant subtitle;
in addition to refuting positivism, Detmold aspires to display the ontological
basis of all ethics and to link that ontology up with such capacious issues
as the meaning of life, the existence of God, and the worth of self-sacrificing
love. In pursuit of these objectives Detmold surveys Homer and Aeschylus,
Plato and Aristotle, Hume and Kant, and a host of moderns. In particular,
he examines the writings* of Kelsen, Hart, Dworkin, and Raz, in each case
with the purpose of exposing the errors into which they fall. It is, however,
precisely at the level of exposition and critique that Detmold fails. As a con-
sequence both his "modest" project of refuting legal positivism and his cosmic
project of fitting law, properly understood, into the great scheme of things
never really get off the ground.
Contemporary ethicians are inclined to pursue ethical issues as if they could,
for the purposes at hand, prescind from the relation that obtains between
those issues and those ultimate questions of origin, end, and meaning on which
philosophers, like humankind generally, have been unable to agree. John Rawls
calls this bracketing of ultimate and contested questions the method of
avoidance and he has attempted both to argue for and to exemplify its utility
in his works. Detmold will have none of this. He insists on setting his refuta-
tion of legal positivism in an ontological context. This, of course, is unexcep-
tionable, even admirable, provided that the ontology invoked is itself intelligible
and its nexus to ethical issues clear. But in Detmold's case neither half of
that proviso is realized.
The ontology that Detmold opts for is a curious amalgam of Ludwig Witt-
genstein's tractarian mysticism and Iris Murdoch's ethical aestheticism. It leads
Detmold to believe that every particular in the universe is possessed of a
mysteriousness that requires from us humans respect for it in its particular-
ity. This gives him his foundation for morality, a pou sto from which to refute
moral sceptics and to correct moral theories that focus, mistakenly in his judg-
ment, on universals. It is hard to know what to make of this attempt to pro-
vide an ontological ground for ethical obligation. Even in antiquity brain-
children were not governed by the same rules that obtained among their ven-
tral analogates; the firstborn of an author's ideas has no presumptive claim
to superiority relative to its later-born siblings. In Wittgenstein's case whatever
reasons the early pages of the Tractatus gave for accepting the mysticism adum-
brated in its later pages were weakened, if not utterly demolished, by the criti-
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que that Wittgenstein himself articulated in his later philosophy. There could,
of course, still be good reasons for embracing the ontology that Detmold
asserts, but this book fails to reveal what those reasons might be, and none
spring readily to this reviewer's mind. For this reason the book must be judged
to be seriously flawed.
Even a flawed book can be an instructive one, but this book is not of that
latter sort. Detmold discusses Kelsen, Hare, Hart, Raz, et al. on reasons for
action, the separation of law and morals, the weight of principles, etc., but
he does not engage the former or illuminate the latter. This failure can be
attributed to at least two sources. One is Detmold's failure to present his adver-
saries' case for their positions carefully and sympathetically. What he does
instead is quote them out of context then comment in a way that reveals his
disagreement with at least one reading of the quoted passage. As a result the
reader not already familiar with what Hare or Hart or Raz has to say is left
unenlightened on that matter, and the reader who has worked through their
difficult texts is left uncertain just how Detmold would reconstruct the entire
text from which the quote is taken.
A second, and related, source of Detmold's failure to engage authors or
illumine issues is his desultory style of writing, which leaves the reader wonder-
ing at every moment what apercu Detmold will announce next. Whether this
too can be traced to the baneful influence of Wittgenstein's juvenilia on Det-
mold's philosophical development cannot be definitively adjudicated. It does
however make reading the book initially disconcerting and eventually irksome.
And that's a shame because many of Detmold's insights are quite sound and
his general 15roject is surely worthy of pursuit. One is left hoping that he
will return to his attempted refutation of positivism sometime soon, but this
time with a sounder ontology and a more patient modus operandi. Till then
the reader interested in a critique of positivism is referred to Philip Soper's
more successful effort in his recent A Theory of Law.
John Robinson
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN. By Richard
A. Epstein. Harvard University Press. 1985.
There is much dissatisfaction with the state of constitutional law scholar-
ship. This dissatisfaction is clearly not due to a lack of interest-the law reviews
are filled with lengthy treatments of both particular areas of constitutional
law and more general discussions of topics such as the role of judicial review
in a democracy. The unease arises from the sense that the massive outpouring
of commentary has established so few accepted principles.'
I. Griswold, "Foreword: The Burger Court and American Institutions," 60 Notre
Dame L. Rev. (1985), p. 827, 829.
